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Introduction
On the same page of  the Nineteenth General Annual Report of the Board 
of Trade1 of  1909 we learn of  the creation of  two new British companies: the 
Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC) and the Anglo Maikop Corporation 
(AMC). None of  these belonged to the first wave of  oil companies who had 
tried to find their place in the emerging international oil industry of  the twen-
tieth century. Both, however, were amongst the British free-standing compa-
nies2 which proliferated at the beginning of  the century only to disappear by 
* The present article is the result of  a stage as a visiting fellow at the School of  Histo-
ry of  the University of  East Anglia (UK) during the year 2013-2014 and of  my work with 
Dr Paul Warde. I am indebted mainly to him but also to my colleagues of  the UEA, espe-
cially Dr Cathie Carmichael and Dr Silvia Evengelisti, for their kind help throughout my re-
search. I would like to thank chiefly, too, Kate and Jonathan Griffin, relatives of George Tweedy, 
who helped to check some of the information included in this article.
My stay at UEA was possible thanks to the University of  Barcelona, which granted a sab-
batical, and the collaboration with the project “New spaces, actors and instruments in Spain’s 
foreign relations with the Arab and muslim worlds” (CSO2011-29438-C05-02). The writing of 
this article was granted by the project “The international dimension of  the political transfor-
mations in the Arab-Islamic world” (CSO2014-52998-C3-3-P).
1. Nineteenth General Annual Report by the Board of  Trade; House of  Commons Pa-
pers; Accounts and Papers, 1910 (168), p. 25. House of  Commons. Parliamentary Papers On-
line http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.882004&res_dat=xri:hcpp&rft_dat=xri: 
hcpp:fulltext:1910-011889 
2. As they are defined, these companies constitute a singular kind of direct foreign invest-
ment for British companies at the end of  the nineteenth and beginning of  the twentieth centu-
ries. These were companies registered in the UK devoted to investing and operating in a single 
sector of  a single foreign country. The typical goal of  the free-standing companies was to ob-
tain capital on the UK “by bringing together profitable or potentially profitable operations 
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the end of the First World War (WWI). In the case of these newcomers, APOC 
survived3 by turning into a big multinational corporation, which was to be 
the arrowhead of  the British oil policy, while AMC disappeared4 and fell into 
oblivion.
The purpose of  this article, based on information obtained from the 
AMC documents currently at the London Metropolitan Archives,5 is two-
fold. First, we will try to recover the history of  this forgotten oil holding. 
Then, we will question whether the expressions failure and fiasco6 might not 
have been too freely applied to all the British companies that invested in Mai-
kop7 during the first decade of  the twentieth century; because if  we adhere 
to Wilkins’ definition (1989:430)8 of  what constitutes failure and success, the 
AMC can be considered an entrepreneurial success, albeit one that took 
place in the failed oilfields.
This affirmation is based on three facts. First: although the Anglo-Mai-
kop Corporation was one of  many companies9 which took part in the 1910 
Maikop oil rush, by the beginning of  World War I the AMC – and its affili-
ates – ended up the only survivors of  the phenomenon.
The second fact is that, according to information found on the minutes of 
the AMC’s Board of Directors’ meetings, at the beginning of 1914 the corpo-
overseas with British investors seeking financial opportunities superior to those at home – though 
frauds were not infrequent (Wilkins, 1988:262-263)”.
3. […] Iran’s small free-standing British oil company in Iran developed into the giant Brit-
ish Petroleum Group (Davenport-Hines and Jones, 1989: 10) “[…] In brief, the two major 
trends for British business in twentieth-century Asia have been investments by British multi-
national corporations, and the decline of  ‘older’ forms of  British business in Asia […] (Daven-
port-Hines and Jones, 1989: 16)”.
4. Legally, the AMC was liquidated in1946. LMA, MS24056.
5. The AMC’s documents are deposited at the London Metropolitan Archives (LMA) 
under the generic ANGLO-MAIKOP GRUP.
6. This opinion is held by Jones (1981:60) and White (1989:74) who wrote, “The highly 
speculative Maikop oilfields were the most disappointing to British capital”. Thus, “The stock 
exchange was generally hostile to small oil companies after the fiasco, of  the 1910 boom in 
‘Maikop’ companies […] (Jones, 1977: 651, note 14)”.
7. Source: White (1989:74). Very similar numbers are recorded in the following years. For 
instance, in the list of British companies provided by P. Ol’ (1981), this phenomenon is also re-
corded. Burdett (2012: vol 1, p.viii), states that “[…] nevertheless, seemingly undaunted by events 
of the First World War, and uncertain future in the region, nearly 90 companies represented Brit-
ish Interests in Eastern petroleum in 1919, including Anglo-Maikop Corporation Ltd., Black Sea 
Oilfields Ltd., Gorium Petroleum, Maikop Combine Ltd. and Spies Petroleum […]”.
8. Wilkins writes that “[…] most of  the mining companies were not successful in corpo-
rate returns […] but they still led to a satisfactory legacy (Wilkins, 1989:430)”.
9. Only in the digital archives of  The Times, for the period covering 1909 to 1914, we can 
find 547 entries related to this phenomenon. In The Times we can read, “[…] so agitated has 
the country been during the past fortnight that our business avocations have suffered, and the 
greatest boom which has ever recorded has lapsed into a semi-somnolent state… off  course it 
is rubber… but oil has taken a good second place… (and)… Maikop Oil Field is being claimed 
more and more every day […] Maikop Oilfields.” Times [London, England], 23 May 1910: 44. 
The Times Digital Archive. Web. 10 June 2014. 
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ration’s holding was already well consolidated and beginning to bear fruit.10 
Furthermore, we know that as far as 1915, segments of the holding – its refin-
eries and trading companies – were still making a profit and paying dividends. 
For example, in the balance of 13 April 1915 of the Kuban Refining Compa-
ny Ltd – an AMC asset – a dividend is mentioned of 10%; and in the Direc-
tors’ Report of said company, presented in September and dated 16 January 
1916, an “average” dividend is announced of 2s per 1-pound share.11
Third and last, in 1918, the AMC reached an agreement with the Narod-
ny Bank of Moscow in order to sell all its assets and interests for the sum of 
three million pounds. The deal was vetoed by the British,12 who in 1918 launched 
a campaign in Southern Russia to secure British control over the Caucasus 
oil.13 That notwithstanding, we can consider three million a sum indicative14 
of  the fact that the AMC managed to create a prosperous, integrated, region-
al oil holding, with a distribution network covering all Southern Russia. It is 
true, however, that in the aftermath of  the Soviet Revolution and the end of 
WWI, the company ceased to exist in practice.
We believe that the AMC’s success was due to the fact that, in contrast 
with other companies involved in Maikop, it didn’t limit its activity to the 
extraction of  crude oil but rather extended it to the creation of  a vertically 
integrated holding and of  a new regional fuel market. The reason for this 
would lie in the fact that the AMC’s founder, George Tweedy, learnt his trade 
in the favourable context of  the Russian oil industry (ROI) of  the beginning 
of  the twentieth century. An industry that, although practically non-existent 
in the 1920s, at the turn of  the century had been the world’s most advanced. 
This affirmation, subscribed both by Tolf  (1976) and Jones (1978), is based 
not in the ROI’s quantitative weight – already in those years the United 
States’ out produced Russia – but in its technological and industrial devel-
opment, which, as early as 1879, had laid the foundations for the transition 
from coal to oil. The most remarkable example of  that advancement is that 
by the 1880s oil was being used as fuel in several railway lines, like the Tran-
scaspian and Transcaucasian, in the Caspian and Volga fleets, and in the 
10. Although both companies were already paying dividends, in 1911 (or 1911-1912) Black 
Sea Oilfields paid a dividend of 11½, and the AMC, in 1912-1913, one of 5%. “Oil companies”. 
Times [London, England] 21 July 1913: 18. The Times Digital Archive. Web. 11 June 2014.
11. LMA, MS24071.
12. White (1984:83).
13. Source NA WO 32/10118 and NA, WO 32/5716.
14. These are some estimates of  the sums invested by British oil companies in the Russian 
oil sector. Jones (1981: 48) writes in his Oil and Petroleum Manual of  2012, that Skinner gives 
an estimate 21.7 million pounds as the total sum of the nominal capital on British oil compa-
nies in Russia. This would mean that the AMC could have been sold for a little over 10% of 
that sum, when the oil in Maikop was only 1.2% of Russia’s total in 1916 (Aldebert, 1910:1). 
This gap between its monetary value and its productive value brings us to the conclusion that 
the AMC holding had to be valuable. 
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Baku industry,15 By the end of  the nineteenth century, the main difference be-
tween the American and Russian oil industries was that the former had al-
ready created a development block16 associated to the use of  petroleum as fuel, 
while the latter continued to rely, basically, on the production and sale of 
lighting kerosene.
With these facts in mind, we can relate the history of  AMC to the concep-
tual framework of  Alison Fleigh Frank’s thesis, when she writes that “under-
standing the oil development in the nineteenth century requires forgetting 
much of  what one knows about oil (…) today”.17 We also adhere to her sug-
gestion that the twentieth century’s oil industry was built on the shoulders of 
individual entrepreneurs who benefited from their belonging in a particular 
social, political and cultural context in which local, regional, continental and 
global influences interacted,18 and who were smart enough to take the knowl-
edge available to them and perfect it. From this point of  view, the birth of  the 
oil industry should be construed as a collective and evolutionary story with-
in which individual geniuses probably existed,19 although they took advantage 
of  being in the right place at the right moment, and of  building on founda-
tions already in place.
In accordance with this idea, the present work articulates itself  in the fol-
lowing manner. First, we shall explain the development of  the Russian oil in-
dustry at the Caucasus, to prove that the transition to petroleum took place 
in that scenario, earlier than in any other place in the world; and that for this 
reason, we can call the Russian industry of  that time the most modern in the 
world. This will allow us to explain the oil industry scenario to which the Brit-
ish free-standing companies arrived, and how this was the core from which 
the AMC’s activity sprung. 
Building on this idea, we will describe the Maikop “oil rush” analysing 
the differences between the AMC’s strategy – to create a regional, vertically 
integrated, oil holding – and those of  the rest of  the Maikop investors. From 
there, the third part of  the article peruses the success story of  the AMC. Fi-
nally, we will establish how the AMC’s case begs to modify two of  the prem-
ises long established by the literature on the free-standing British companies 
that invested in Russian oil: the first of  these would be the idea that, before 
15. Gulbenkian (1881:384-386) bears witness to that early use of  petroleum in the Rus-
sian fleet and in its railways.
16. “Development blocks” are defined in Kander, Malanima & Warde (2013:8) as a “a 
series of  systems of  technology, infrastructure, energy sources, and institutions by which eco-
nomic growth proceeds”.
17. Fleig Frank (2007:49). 
18. Fleig Frank (2007:6).
19. A great deal of  the literature dealing with the oil industry’s history is based on the 
personal genius of its founder or manager. Good examples are Yerguin (1991); Gerretson (1957); 
Tolf  (1976), and Bamberg (2000).
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WWI, British entrepreneurs had a key role in the transference of  know-how, 
technology and other assets into Russia.20 To the contrary, all the evidence 
from the personal life of  the AMC’s founder indicates that his “school” for 
all oil-related matters had been Russia21 and not the United Kingdom. 
The second idea is that this company was the exception to the Maikop 
failure because, although the region never was to be the Eldorado promised 
by the City in 1910, AMC fared much better than the rest22 due mainly – ac-
cording to its director – to the fact that they had been capable of  integrating 
in one holding all the activity of  the oil value chain: from extraction to the fi-
nal customer.
Caucasus Oil in the International Scene
The birth of  the modern Russian oil industry is commonly dated to 1873, 
when the Nobel brothers arrived in Baku, only three years after Rockefeller’s 
foundation of  Standard Oil. This synchrony originated a fierce competition 
between Russians and Americans for supremacy in the world’s oil produc-
tion.23 The competition notwithstanding, the fact is that the American and 
Russian oil industries shared a set of  similar circumstances and faced com-
mon problems, which they solved in different ways because at local and re-
gional levels each one of  them worked in very different “oil scenarios”.
The shared circumstances were the exchange of  knowledge between the 
old and new worlds. Where the United States and Canada benefited from Eu-
rope’s scientific development, which resulted in the creation of  a market for 
the commercialisation of  an oil-based product: lighting kerosene, Europe in 
turn benefited from the importation of  American drilling techniques, and es-
pecially Canadian ones. The first kerosene lamp was manufactured and mar-
20. “British business, again before 1914, had an impact in economic growth by transfer-
ring enterprise and technology into Asia. Its pioneering role in […] Russian oil emerges from 
these essays. Britain provided the entrepreneurship, management, marketing skills and tech-
nology which, for whatever reasons, were absent from those economies at that time, and the 
development of  these new industries was a product of  British enterprise”, in Davenport-Hines, 
R.P.T. & Jones, G. (1989:26).
21. Personal correspondence with Mr Tweedy’s descendants indicates that he was of 
humble origins, born in Northumberland, and with no ties to the oil industry. They confirm 
that George Tweedy spent a great deal of  time in Russia, that he spoke the language and that 
he knew their customs. They confirmed also that G.T. had been working in Russia well before 
the Maikop “oil rush”.
22. “[…] Voici comme se présente la production de Maikop […] La diminution de pro-
duction s’est d’ailleurs étendue a presque toutes les sociétés […] L’Anglo – Maïkop a été plus 
favorisée, puisque elle a obtenu 720.000 contre 499.000; mais la Spies n’est arrivée qu’au chifre 
de 310.000 pouds contre 898.000.” Les Assemblées générales. Recueil... (1913, p.320), in BnF, 
ark:/12148/cb327033681/date
23. Several amusing examples of  that can be found in Marvin (1886) and Henry (1905).
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keted in 1853; three years later the first large-scale refinery was erected in Ru-
mania. Both European achievements were keys to the development of Standard 
Oil in the US. On the other hand, without MacGarvey,24 who in 1884 import-
ed American drilling techniques into Galicia, the old continent’s oil industry 
would never have prospered. 
The ‘common problem’ – which wouldn’t be solved for good until the 
late 1920s – was uncontrolled overproduction, followed by other problems 
of  scarcity or shortage periods. In the 1870s, geology as an applied science 
was not well developed. It was not until 1883 that the anticlinal theory be-
gan to be considered a useful tool for the business and it took a few more 
years for it to be routinely used in prospecting.25 To that day, the discovery 
of  oil had been a matter of  luck, and for that reason, oil digging was con-
sidered an activity fit for adventurers, rather than for serious entrepreneurs. 
On the other hand, the legal framework regulating property rights over 
the subsoil’s produce encouraged the maximal, quickest extraction, while the 
division of  the land in small plots propitiated non-cooperative practices 
among neighbours. 
During those first years, added to an extremely volatile oil market, the 
lack of  knowledge, technical skills and storage facilities would often trans-
form a rich well into huge financial losses and environmental disasters.
Before the development of refining processes and the use of cracking for 
the production of marketable oil based products, solely the density of the 
crude oil determined the quantity and type of produce obtainable. The quan-
titative differences between Russian and American oil were remarkable: only 
30% of Baku’s crude oil was apt for the manufacturing of lighting kerosene, 
while 70%26 of the American produce could be put to that use. This meant that 
the uncertainty prevailing in the nascent oil market derived not only from the 
volatility regarding quantity but also of the lack of security about quality.
Faced with the same problem, Rockefeller in the United Sates and the two 
leading companies in Russia – those belonging to the Nobel brothers and 
Rothschild (House of  Paris) – responded in different ways; although all of 
them understood that the only way to limit risks and the market’s volatility 
– as we shall see G. Tweedy doing during the Maikop oil rush – was to control 
the final link in the oil chain of  value. They understood the advantages of 
vertical integration and of  becoming the lead firm in one or more segments 
of  that chain.
24. William Henry MacGarvey and Stanislaw Szcepanowski imported American drill-
ing techniques into Galicia and were pioneers of  its oil industry, Fleig Frank (2007:90). A few 
years later we will find MacGarvey working as an engineer for G. Tweedy in the development 
of  the AMC’s Deep Drilling project.
25. Pearton (1971:3).
26. Marvin (1886:12).
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Hydrocarbons generate a chain of value with three productive links: up-
stream, midstream and downstream. The upstream includes the exploration, de-
velopment and production of the primary energy source (prospecting, engineer-
ing, drilling…) as well as the extraction of crude oil. The midstream process 
includes the infrastructures for the transportation and storage of the product 
until the moment of refining. In the downstream segment, we find the transfor-
mation of the crude oil and all the activities related to its marketing. These three 
phases are interconnected, since the type and value of the investment and pro-
duction in each one of them are conditioned by the previous segment and de-
termine, in turn, the next one. This is why when a company controls all three 
phases we can say that it is “vertically integrated”.
For a company to be able to hold a decision-making position in the chain 
– for it to be the lead firm and to determine what, how, how much and for 
whom to produce – it is not necessary to be active in all three phases. Under 
certain circumstances, by controlling one of  the three scenarios a company 
can be able to control all the processes. In that sense, Gereffi introduced the 
distinction between producer-driven and buyer-driven27 chains of  value.
In the nineteenth century, Standard Oil, the Nobel brother’s companies, 
and those belonging to the Rothschilds became lead-firms in buyer-driven type 
oil chains by creating and developing activity in the midstream and down-
stream segments. That was how Standard Oil obtained the de facto monopo-
ly of  90% of the American oil industry without owning – indeed, far from it 
– the equivalent number of oil wells. The Nobels and the Rothschilds achieved 
an equivalent position in Russia. Nonetheless, both processes were very dif-
ferent: in Russia the industry oriented itself  towards the creation of  a new 
market, based on a new product – oil as liquid fuel, whereas in the United 
States, Rockefeller concentrated – by means of commercial wars – on expand-
ing the already existing kerosene market on a worldwide scale.28 Paradoxical-
ly, Standard Oil was based on what would become a marginal by-product of 
the oil industry – lighting naphtha, whereas the Russian companies, which 
wouldn’t survive WWI, pioneered the creation of  a product that would sub-
stitute coal as fuel and adapted it to be used in transportation. 
In his book The Russian Rockefellers, Robert W. Tolf suggests that the whole 
story of the ROI’s fin de siècle was, in fact, the work of one man: Ludwig No-
bel.29 His role can’t be denied, as long as we make it clear that at that time, in the 
27. Gereffi (1994).
28. Gerretson’s thesis (1957) was that Standard Oil considered the world as its “natural” 
market and for that reason, when it needed the foreign markets to absorb the interior market’s 
surplus, Standard tried to appropriate them by bursting the kerosene prices. 
29. Tolf  (1976:61). 
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Caucasus, circumstances were favourable to Nobel’s new business model;30 
a model that the Rothschilds would perfect and that George Tweedy, 
founder of  AMC, would implement near the Black Sea. These circum-
stances were seven.
In the first place, we have the quality of  the oil, which contained a low 
percentage of  kerosene and a very high level of  residue, and was ultimately 
converted into fuel for transportation.31 The Russian oil produced mazout32 
directly, and in Russia its cost was relatively lower than that of  coal33 and of 
more energetic value.34
In second place, the scarcity of wood in Southern Russia facilitated the in-
troduction of the new kind of fuel in that market.35 Thirdly, the geographical 
situation of the Caucasus, on the periphery of the Russian empire, necessitat-
ed the construction of transportation and storage facilities. In the fourth place, 
the industry benefited from the direct patronage of the Czars; the Nobels, par-
ticularly, were on excellent terms with them and with their ministers.36 The fifth 
reason was the great development experienced in those years by the Russian 
applied sciences, like chemistry, geology and engineering, which boosted the 
 
30. […] Les fréres Nobel ont été des pionners dans tous les domaines […], bien entendu, 
[ils] n’auraient pas pu faire tout ce qu’ils ont entrepris pour cette industrie, si la situation […] 
n’avait pas été favorable.’ En L’industrie pétrolière en Russie avant et depuis la révolution. Ses 
perpectives d’avenir. Le Génie Civil, 23 January 1926 (p.  87), BnF, http://catalogue.bnf.fr/
ark:/12148/cb34348662d.
31. Jones (1978:134) states that “[...] it was in Russia where large-scale use of  oil was pi-
oneered […] Given the weakness of  the domestic Russian coal industry, exacerbated by im-
mense inland transportation problems, oil-fuel soon found a market”.
32. Op. cit., Gulbenkian (1881: 384-386). 
33. “Owing to the copiousness and cheapness of  the supply, astaki has become of late 
years the principal fuel in south-east Russia, being now used instead of  coal by more than 250 
tank passenger steamers on the Volga and Caspian, several locomotives, and over 1,000 sta-
tionary engines”, Marvin, (1886:16). In Jones (1978:135) we read that “in the early 1880s a ton 
of  astaki was ‘thirty or forty times’ times cheaper than a ton of  coal”. And in the cited text, 
Marvin goes on to compare the amount of  4d per ton of  astaki in Baku with the 25 to 30d per 
ton in British coal.
34. “Avant les desordres de Baku en 1905 […] en dehors du pétrole brut, étaient vendues 
7.000.000 de tonnes de residus, vendus inmediatement comme combustible (11.000 calories 
contre 5 à 6.000 pour le carbón de Donetz) […]”. M. 170-23236 – L’Industrie pétrolifère russe 
actuelle 622-338 (47). Le Moins minier et métallurgique (Paris), 1910 (p.130); BnF, ark:/12148/
cb32817765f/date
35. This explanation is to be found in Pearton (1971); in Garreth (1978), and in Tolf (1976). 
Marvin (1886:19) writes that “lack of wood was one of the reasons for the development of the 
tanker oil transportation, since wood barrels were scarce and costly”. 
36. To elaborate on that would be the matter of a different article. Suffice it to say that one 
of the greatest challenges of the nascent oil industry was to find and secure good, stable consum-
ers. With the exception of Standard Oil’s first years, the industry developed thanks to the state, 
via admiralties and war ministries. This was the case for Galicia (Fleig Frank, 2007) and the Unit-
ed Kingdom (Jones, 1977). The good relationship of the Nobels with the Czars and with the min-
ister Witte is recorded in Tolf  (1976). 
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local oil industry, as well as the exchange of qualified personnel and the at-
traction of  oil experts.37 
Another factor that conspired to the success of the oil business in the Cau-
casus was that a previous oil industry had existed – that of  the Austro-Hun-
garian empire – from which the newcomers could learn some valuable les-
sons.38 And finally, the ROI was nurtured by the need of  companies like the 
Rothschilds and Shell to secure new supplies for their refineries abroad and 
to face off  Standard Oil’s competition.39
It was in that context, after 1873, that the Nobels revolutionized the Baku 
oil industry. They began by applying American drilling techniques;40 after 
that, in 1882, they built one of  the first “continuous distillation” refineries in 
the world, and developed the technology for better use of  the residue – the 
mazout or astaki – and thus making it into the prevalent kind of fuel in South-
ern Russia.41 Finally, they fostered a revolution in the transportation, storage 
and distribution of  oil, by creating a vertically integrated company. 
The Nobels adapted and perfected American techniques in a favourable 
environment and they revolutionized sea and railway transportation, because 
apart from implementing the use of  oil as fuel, they created the means for it 
to be used on a large scale in two ways: they lowered its cost by facilitating 
the long distant transportation of  the product – theirs was the world’s first 
tanker, the Zoroaster, built in Sweden in 1879 and the maiden ship of  an im-
pressive tanker fleet – and they created a market for their product, by manu-
facturing boilers and engines adapted to the use of  mazout.
For all that, it is pertinent to say that the Russian Oil Industry (rather than 
its American counterpart) lay the foundations for the creation of  an oil-relat-
ed development block. Although this was to be just a regional development 
block, its existence allows us to say that in the early years of  the twentieth 
century, the ROI was the most advanced in the world since it made the initial 
breakthrough in the transition from coal to petroleum.
37. These were the years of  Count Witte’s tenure as Minister of  Finance and Prime Min-
ister of  the Russian empire. He was the ‘father’ of  one of  the most impressive railways as well 
as an advocate of  the use of  applied sciences and technology in industry. In 1886, Mendeleyev 
travelled twice to the Caucasus in order to inspect the oil facilities in Baku, and suggested new 
uses for them. Witte appointed him as ministerial consultant. 
38. This idea is suggested in Fleig Frank (2007).
39. This idea is inherent to Gerretson’s explanation (1957:19).
40. Until that moment drilling was done by hand. Good descriptions of  the process can 
be read in Gulbenkian (1881). For the specific case of  Maikop, the Vinda Report (LMA, 
MS24056) and Winda, The Maikop Oilfields, both give a good account. The different spell-
ings of  the name of  that engineer and geologist depend on the translation; we use one or the 
other depending on the form used in the cited sources. 
41. It can be said that this fuel, known today as bunker or residual fuel, is the one still 
in use in the great transatlantic cruisers and shipping.
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This modern industry was enriched by the contribution of  Rothschild 
(House of Paris), who had arrived in Baku in 1884. The Rothschilds brought 
in the funds for the construction of the infrastructure that was needed for the 
development of the Mediterranean oil market42 – a railway system and the Ba-
ku-Batumi pipeline – and funded the Petroleum Company of the Caspian and 
the Black Sea, known as BNITO.43 Furthermore, together with Royal Dutch, 
Shell and other local companies, they created the first international company 
for oil operations, whereas Standard Oil remained a mere exporter.44 It was 
also due to the Rothschilds’ initiative that for the first time in history an at-
tempt was made to create an international oil cartel as a way to harness the 
market’s extraordinary volatility.45
To sum up, by the end of  the nineteenth century the Russian industry had 
vertically integrated its companies, had begun a first transition to oil as a fuel, 
and had launched the first attempt at a cartelization of  the world market. It 
was still a long way from the international oil industry that was to emerge af-
ter WWI, but when it came, that modern industry resembled a lot more the 
Russian oil “world” rather than the American model of  Standard Oil.
It was to that modern oil industry that the British free standing compa-
nies arrived at the beginning of  the twentieth century. Although before 1909 
there were some British advocates of  the Russian oil cause46 (figure 1), very 
few British companies – less than two per year – were active in Russia between 
42. According to Gerretson (1957), before the WWI the three producers in the Mediter-
ranean were Romania, Galicia and Russia. Their production was exported via the Black Sea. 
Constanza and Batumi were the two main oil harbours in the Mediterranean. Oil exports with 
origins in Russia were directed to the oriental markets and the Dutch Indies, through the Suez 
canal, and to Atlantic Europe through Gibraltar. In 1926, in “L’industrie pétrolière en Russie 
avant et depuis la révolution. Ses perspectives d’avenir”, we read that “Tout le bassin de la 
Méditerranée dependait de l’industrie pétrolière russe […] Jusqu’à la grande guerre, on avait 
pompé par les pipe-lines de Batoum environ 40.000 wagons-citernes de pétrole lampant et les 
expeditions totales de ce port à destination des pays étrangers étaient de 60.000 wagons”.
43. In 1897, the Suez Canal Authority granted Marcus Samuel (Shell) permission for the 
transportation of  oil through the canal. Samuel and the Rothschilds became partners in 1902 
(LMA, MS24070). With Royal Dutch they created the Asiatic Petroleum Company, which be-
came the Royal Dutch-Shell trading company. In Jonker et al. (2007:22) it is stated that “[...] 
BNITO was considerably bigger than either Royal Dutch or Shell Transport, but rather less 
profitable and heavily reliant on Asian export revenues”. In 1906, the Rothschilds, the Nobels 
and Royal Dutch-Shell, together with some others, created the European Petroleum Union, in 
an effort to organize the market. 
44. Gerretson (1957:19).
45. As explained by Tolf  (1976:89), in 1892 and 1893 negotiations were undertaken to 
bring together all oil production into one system. The Rothschilds and the Nobels grouped the 
small Russian producers. Standard Oil, however, didn’t honour their part of  the deal and it 
ended in failure in 1895. Afterwards, another deal was reached, by which Sandard Oil retained 
75% of the exportation market while the Russian companies kept the remaining 25%. This pact 
was never implemented.
46. The main advocates of  the cause were Henry (1905) and Marvin (1886), who wrote 
a number of  pamphlets in favour of  British investments in Russian oil.
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1884 and 1989. In 1910, however, 61 British companies were registered.47 
Most of  them were active in the “new” oilfields of  the Caucasus – Grozni and 
Maikop – and 50 of  them settled themselves in Maikop.48
Today we know that the Maikop oilfields were second rate,49 compared to 
those in Baku, but at the time, after the 1905 unrest in Baku – when a massa-
cre of  the Armenian population occasioned the loss of  most of  the oil pro-
ducing infrastructure – those in Grozni and especially Maikop were seen as 
the great hope for Russian oil50 because of  the good quality of  their produce 
47. Skinner (1912) counts up to 300 British oil companies with overseas activity, and if  
our data is correct, about 20% of them were operating in Russia.
48. The Times gives a similar figure: “…under these favourable circumstances over 50 
Maikop companies were floated on the London market within a few months…”, “British Cap-
ital In Russi”. Times [London, England] 19 Aug. 1910: 11. The Times Digital Archive. Web. 
10 June 2014. Skinner (1912) also supplies a very similar recount. 
49. According to statistics supplied by Winda, the registered production for the Maikop 
oilfields was, in 1907, of  32,680 poods. In 1909 – the year of  the “first” pump – 572,385 poods, 
and in 1911 production increased 30-fold: 7,837,243 (Winda, 1913:40). These figures are very 
similar to those supplied by Adebert. According to his aggregated classification (1929:1), in 
1916 the production at the Caucasus was distributed as follows: Maikop 1.2%, Grosny 17%, 
Baku 78% and others 3.8%.
50. “[…] Il existe enfin les gisements de Maïkop dont l’exploitation ne fait que commenc-
er mais promet, d’ores et déjà, de brillants résultats […]” Révue Contemporaine, Saint Pétes-
bourg, 1911, p. 302, BnF, http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb328566919/date, and “[…] Sans 
doute, l’exploitation du naphte se développera aussi dans la région de Kouban, près de Maïkop 
FIGURE 1 ▪ Number of British oil companies registered as having petroleum activity in 
Russia
Source: OI’ P.V; National Archives, Board of Trade: Companies Registration Office; The Times Digital Archives; House 
of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online, Companies. General Annual Report by the board of Trade; Anglo-Maikop 
Corporation archives and own.
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and their proximity to the Black Sea. Thus, coinciding with the popularisa-
tion of the “general theory of oil science”,51 a massive publicity campaign was 
orchestrated about the bounties of  the Maikop fields, probably financed by 
some City companies but also most likely by Russian geologists and engi-
neers,52 which made a huge profit out of  the situation. That campaign was 
based on three premises: that in Maikop oil was as abundant as in Baku; that 
its quality was superior; and that it was cheaper, due to Maikop’s geographi-
cal proximity to the Black Sea ports.
The campaign for the attraction of  new investors went wild after 12 Sep-
tember 1909, when prospectors struck oil at plot number 409 in Maikop. The 
concession owners were the Black Sea Oilfields Ltd., a Registered Public Com-
pany under the direction of  George Tweedy, the architect of  the Anglo-Mai-
kop Corporation.
There is very little information about George Tweedy’s origins, although it 
has been established that before arriving in Maikop he had worked for the 
Baku Russian Petroleum Company.53 Unlike most of the British entrepre-
neurs54 in the region, Tweedy was well acquainted with Russia, its culture and 
language.55 We believe that it was through his previous experience in Baku that 
Tweedy acquired the necessary ‘modern’ knowledge to be a success in the oil 
business. We also know that he had to be familiar with the experience in Gali-
cia, since he recruited William Henry McGarvey as his technical adviser and 
director of the Deep Drilling project.56 Our perusal of the speeches and min-
utes of the AMC’s meetings leads us to conclude that George Tweedy had a 
solid knowledge of all aspects of the nascent oil business of the twentieth cen-
[…] Si le naphte de Bakou est principalement dirigé vers le Nord par la mer Caspienne et en-
suite par le Volga, pour approvisionner la partie orientale de la Russie, le naphte de Grosnoï 
et de Maïkop se dirigera naturellement vers l’Ouest, vers la Mer Noire […]”, op. cit  p. 50.
51. Winda (1913:5)
52. The better known by the British public were V.I. Winda, E. de Hautpick and P. 
Dvorkovitz
53. Proof of  this relationship can be found in an adversisement for the “Baku Russian 
Petroleum Company, (Limited).” Times [London, England] 21 June 1898: 3. The Times Digi-
tal Archive. Web. 10 June 2014
54. White (1989:78) writes: ‘Compared with their competitors, the British seldom adapt-
ed themselves or their products to the Russian market […] The British waited for business to 
come to them in their city-centred offices […] they also persisted in communicating with their 
Russian customers largely in English […]’
55. This can be deduced from most of  his reports to the shareholders meetings and form 
information handed down by his descendants. In fact, as we will see in the following narrative, 
the AMC ended up a “russified” company.
56. Some facts suggest that there was a network of  contacts between people and knowl-
edge from Galicia and Maikop. John Simeon Bergheim, who was MacGarvey’s partner in Gali-
cia, created the International Maikop, an oil company (Fleig Frank, Oil Empire, p.89), which 
later was absorbed by the AMC (see table 1). Memorandum of the Maikop Oilfields Deeper 
Drilling Project, with short extracts from a letter from MacGarvey to George Tweedy can be 
read at LMA, MS24056.
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tury. What is more, he firmly believed that all evidence pointed to the oil busi-
ness being the great industry of the future.57 The fact is that under his guid-
ance, AMC was the only successful British concern in Maikop, and the only 
one which created – by itself  – a vertically integrated oil company before WWI.
The “oil rush” in the Maikop oilfields
The Maikop oilfields are located in the southwest, in Kubanskaya, Shiry-
anskaya, Haddijensakaya, Apsheronskaya and Neftstiaya (number 1, map 
158). In 1910 the area was part of  the Cossack region (oblast) of  Kuban, and 
under the legal administration of  the Tersk Cossacks. 
In February 1911, The Engineering and Mining Journal described the oil-
field area as a 660 sq. mile surface, with an oilfield core of  39 sq. miles around 
the first gusher.59 There were two main links to the outside world (number 2, 
map 1). The first way was the Maikop-Tuaspe line; 50 to 66 miles along the 
Black Sea shore. On that route, the oil was transported by means of  an old 
57. Anglo Maikop Corporation, Ordinary General Meeting, reported in The Financial 
News, March 11, 1915. LMA, MS24056.
58. Two maps much more detailed than those provided in the present article can be con-
sulted in the British Library, under Maps 14.A. 31 and Maps 43001. (1.).
59. A mile equals 1.609344 km. The consulted article can be found in LMA, MS240056.
MAP 1 ▪ Maikop oilfields and extended area
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military railway and afterwards via a pipeline built by the Maikop Mutual Oil 
Transport Company Ltd. The second route was another pipeline, assembled 
by the Maikop Pipeline & Transport General Ltd., which covered 75 miles be-
tween the Maikop oilfields and the Enem station. From there, the pipeline 
connected with the Novorosik railway and the Russian hinterland, and with 
the steamship line on the Kuban River to the Sea of  Azov. Thanks to this net-
work, the Maikop oil could reach both the Russian and Mediterranean mar-
kets, and for that reason the situation of  the Maikop oilfields was considered 
much better than that of  those in Baku and Grozni.
Another advantage often mentioned, although sometimes contradictory 
information arises on this point, was that since Maikop was under the admin-
istration of  the Kuban Cossacks, some formalities concerning royalties and 
contracts were easier.60 Regardless of  these facilities, procedures were time 
consuming because imperial consent was needed for each concession. The pa-
perwork to obtain it would begin near the regional authorities; then, in some 
cases, it went on to the Cossack administration in Tersk, which, in turn, sent 
the application to the Viceroy or the governor general of  the Causasus, who 
would forward it to the Moscow government. From there, if  the imperial plac-
et was granted, the last step would be the consent’s official publication.61
The explosion of  the gusher in plot 49 (circle 1, map 1) marked the begin-
ning of  the speculative oil rush in Maikop.62 Although there is no reliable in-
formation on what exactly was authorised, invested and lost in these oilfields, 
estimates are that a colossal amount (9 to 13 million pounds) was authorized 
in the London Exchange between 1910 and 1912 destined to Maikop.63 This 
60. The average agreement with the Kuban authorities was of  2 Kopecks for the first 
500,000 poods, and from then on, 1 Kopeck per pood up to 1 million poods. The royalty for 
the remainder was of  7.5%. Besides these compulsory payments there was a minimum annual 
fee of  6,000 roubles. Sometimes, this amount was substituted by payment in kind. “Maikop 
Oilfields”. Times [London, England] 23 May 1910: 44. The Times Digital Archive. Web. 11 
June 2014.
61. Procedure described in a letter to Messrs Spyer & Sons, dated St. Petersburg, 13/16 
June, 1911, from Maikop Apsheron Oil Co. Ltd. (LMA, MS24084). Part of  this complication 
was due to the fact that Russian legislation at the time forbade foreign companies from own-
ing property in the country. Hence, the company had to be managed via a trust, in the name 
of a Russian citizen. As Gurushia explains (1989), this originated the creation of  Anglo Rus-
sian clusters of  business interests within which companies specializing in different activities 
coexisted. This complex system allowed for all kinds of  scams and corrupt practices.
62. “[…] was the signal for the formation of  the majority of  the Maikop companies, the 
enthusiasm culminating in the wild acquisition of  plots scattered in all directions […] Never-
theless, purchasers readily secured even the hopeless plots […]”, Winda (1913:7).
63. Our estimate, based on Skinner (1912), is of 13,019,050 pounds (see table 1, column 
5). In 1910, The Times gave the figure of £12 million as “British Capital In Russia”. Times [Lon-
don, England] 19 Aug. 1910: 11. The Times Digital Archive. Web. 11 June 2014; a year later, in 
“Developments in Oil”. Times [London, England] 21 Oct. 1912: 16. The Times Digital Archive. 
Web. 10 June 2014, the figure was £13 million. In one of his speeches, Tweedy mentioned 9 mil-
lion pounds. Fourth Ordinary General Meeting of the AMC, adjourned from 23 December 1914 
to March 10 1915 reprinted from The Financial News, 11 March 1915. LMA, MS24056.
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TABLE 1 ▪ British Companies registered to carry out oil-related activities in Maikop 
(1909-1911*5)










Anglo Maikop Petroleum Syndicate 1909      
Maikop Oil Fields Syndicate Ltd. 1909      
Anglo-Russian Maikop Oil Company Ltd. 1910     200,000
Australian Maikop Oil Company Ltd. 1910     275,000
British Maikop Oil Company Ltd. 1910     120,000
International Maikop Ltd. 1910     83,000
Kuban Black Sea Oilfields Ltd. 1910     300,000
Kuban Contracts Syndicate Ltd. 1910      
Kuban Rovine Trust Ltd. 1910      
Kuban Syndicate Ltd. 1910     1,000
Kuban Valley Oil Fields Syndicate Ltd. 1910      
London and Maikop Oil Corporation Ltd. 1910     600,000
Maikop Alliance Syndicate Ltd. 1910     31,000
Maikop and Eastern Oil Company Ltd. 1910     50,000
Maikop and General Petroleum Trust Ltd. 1910     300,000
Maikop Apsheron Oil Company Ltd. 1910     450,000
Maikop Areas Ltd. 1910     600,000
Maikop Associated Oil Properties Ltd. 1910     100
Maikop Boring and Concessions Ltd. 1910     50,000
Maikop Central Company Ltd. 1910     250,000
Maikop Co-operative Petroleum 
Company Ltd. 1910     150,000
Maikop Consolidated Syndicate Ltd. 1910     125,000
Maikop District Oil Company Ltd. 1910     50,000
Maikop European and General Oil Trust 
Ltd. 1910      
Maikop Hadijensky Syndicate Ltd. 1910     30,000
Maikop Main Line Syndicate Ltd. 1910     10,000
Maikop Midlands Oilfields 1910     157,000
Maikop Moscow Oil Company, Ltd. 1910     175,000
Maikop Mutual Oil Transport Company 
Ltd. 1910     416,250
Continued on next page
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Maikop Neftiania Syndicates Ltd. 1910      
Maikop Oil and Petroleum Producers 
Ltd. 1910     425,000
Maikop Oil Lands Ltd. 1910     100
Maikop Oil Proprietary Company Ltd. 1910     252,500
Maikop Oil Territories Ltd. 1910     175,000
Maikop Pipeline & T.G. Ltd. 1910     510,000
Maikop Premier Oil Syndicate Ltd. 1910     150,000
Maikop Prusskaya Oil Company Ltd. 1910     26,000
Maikop Refineries 1910     50,000
Maikop Russian Oil Company Ltd. 1910     150,000
Maikop Samurskaja Oil Syndicate Ltd. 1910     10,000
Maikop Selected Oilfields 1910     400,000
Maikop Shirvansky Oil Company Ltd. 1910     140,000
Maikop Spies Company 1910     260,000
Maikop Standard Oil Fields Ltd. 1910     120,000
Maikop Taman Oil Company Ltd. 1910     175,000
Maikop Tuapse Oil Company Ltd. 1910     120,000
Maikop United Oil Estates Ltd. 1910     100
Maikop Valley Oil Company Ltd. 1910     400,000
Maikop Zyaukas Ltd. 1910      
Maikop-Taman Oil Company Ltd. 1910      
Northern Maikop Petroleum Company 
Ltd. 1910     50,000
Russian Kuban Industrial and Petroleum 
Company Ltd. 1910     405,000
Standard Oil Company of Maikop 
(Schirvanski) Ltd. 1910      
Amalgamated Oil Fields (Maikop) Ltd. 1911     300,000
Anglo Maikop Coorporation Ltd. 1911     650,000
Kuban Oil Lands Ltd. 1911     3,000
Levanoskaya Petroleum Company 
(Maikop) 1911     300,000
Maikop Orient Company Ltd. 1911     250,000
Continued on next page
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Maikop Victory Oil Company 1911     3,075,000
Premier Kuban (Maikop) Oil Company 
Ltd. 1911     60,000
Maikop Combine Ltd. 1912      
Maikop Deep Drilling Company 1912     100,000
Maikop New Producers 1912     159,000
Kuban Refining Compant Ltd. 1913      
Oil Royalties of Maikop Ltd. 1913      
Black Sea Amalgamated Oilfields Ltd. 
(Maikop) 1915      
Total    20  35 13,019,050
*1 The list of the companies is the result of the companies listed or named in any of these five sources Ol’ P.V.; 
National Archives, Board of Trade: Companies Registration Office; The Times archives; House of Commons 
Parliamentary Papers Online, Companies. General Annual Report by the Board of Trade; Anglo-Maikop Corporation 
archives. There are two additional lists that the Foreign Office made in 1919 at the event of the Conference of Peace. 
Those lists are entitled List of Principal Oil Companies operating around Caspian and Black Sea & Inner Caucasus 
and List of Britain Interests in the Caucasus (Burdett, 2012:494-515). In the former, 12 out of 50 oil companies 
operated in the Maikop oilfields in 1919; and in the latter, 41 of 92 appear as registered as having plots or undertaking 
some kind of oil-related activity in Maikop, in the same year. The difference in number between the data of those lists 
and our table is due to the fact that the first list only took into account the upstream oil companies, while the second 
one includes all sorts of oil companies without any reference to its creation date. Our table includes all sorts of oil 
companies, operating in the Maikop Oilfields, which were created between 1909 and 1911, because our aim was to 
capture the effect of the “oil rush”.
*2 Year is the year of creation; this year is the result of two different sources, the year of registration in the Board of 
Trade, consulted through the National Archives on-line catalogue; the companies listed in the General Annual Report 
by the Board of Trade (several years) and the company’s prospectus published in The Times.
*3 Mr Vidna’s reports listed the names of the companies which were actually drilling or having some kind of activity 
at some point between 1910 and 1911.
*4 The companies listed under “relationship with Anglo Maikop Corporation” were – according the Anglo Maikop 
Corporation archives or The Times archives – either part of the AMC holding (horizontal stripes) or had some kind 
of agreement or alliance with it (vertical stripes).
*5 In this list we include some companies that were created after 1911. These were the result of the amalgamation 
or association of pre-existing companies under the influence of the AMC.
*6 Authorised capital at the London market according to Skinner’s Oil and Petroleum Manual 1912.
The Success of the Anglo-Maikop Corporation Within the Fiasco of the Maikop “Oil Rush”
112
phenomenon, which was part of  a broader one, was described as a sequel of 
the “rubber rush” caused by the incipient development of  the automobile in-
dustry.64 The Maikop experience stands out for two reasons. The first is the 
enormous gap between the great quantity of  money attracted and the rela-
tively small sum actually invested in Maikop. The second, as George Tweedy 
himself  pointed out, was that “Maikop was really the first oilfield for which 
money was subscribed, at the beginning, almost entirely by the general pub-
lic [however] the general public does not […] know that in oil-winning, time 
and patience are necessary; it looks for quick results”.65
According to the available information, it seems that by the end of  1913, 
only 320,000 pounds out of  the total authorized sum had found its way to the 
actual perforation of  oil wells in Maikop. It has been suggested that approx-
imately 75% of the attracted capital was lost.66 
In 1910 Maikop, the extraction methods were very primitive and mecha-
nized drilling was only testimonial. Vinda establishes that the deepest well ex-
ploited by the Black Sea Oilfields Ltd., was 1,755 feet deep (some 535 meters), 
but that 61% of the rest never reached 350 feet (about 160 meters).67 The same 
report explains that out of  the 700 plots that should have been leased, only 
130 ever registered any kind of  activity.68
The most likely reason for this extremely low activity would be that a good 
deal of  the capital authorized in London never reached its intended destina-
tion, but it is also true that a good part of  it was wasted in sloppy drilling op-
erations.69 In fact we have established (third column, table 1) that only 20 com-
panies out of  the 50 registered ever tried to extract petroleum and it is also a 
fact that only “a handful of  them” were even really working in the zone.70
64. In the First Ordinary Annual General Meeting of  the AMC Reprinted from The Fi-
nancial Times of  18 May 1911, a Lloyd George is quoted saying that  “[…] to help his financ-
es had received by the boom in oil and rubber shares last spring […]”. LMA, MS24056.
65. George Tweedy’s speech at the Fourth Ordinary General Meeting of  the AMC, ad-
journed from 23 December 1914 to March 10 1915 Reprinted in The Financial News, 11 March 
1915. LMA, MS24056.
66. George Tweedy’s speech at the Fourth Ordinary General Meeting of  the AMC, ad-
journed from 23 December 1914 to March 10 1915. Reprinted in The Financial News, 11 
March 1915. LMA, MS24056. Skinner (1912), informs, as well, that much of  the authorised 
capital was never disbursed and another part never reached its destination. In L’industrie du 
pétrole, in 1911 (p. 42), in Les Assemblées générales. Recueil..., BnF identification ark:/12148/
cb327033681/date, we can read, “En deux ans […] plus des trois quarts des capitals utile de ces 
compagnies ont été perdus”. 
67. This report is part of  the Memorandum for the Maikop Oilfields Deeper Drilling 
Project, 21 September 1911. LMA, MS24056.
68. Tweedy said that “the greater part of  the fields, representing the greatest interest for 
prospecting drilling has up to now not been touched”. Memorandum of the Maikop Associ-
ation, 21 September 1911. LMA, MS24056.
69. For a description of  this phenomenon, see Winda (1913).
70. The Engineering and Mining Journal, 25 February 1911 (LMA, MS24056) cites The 
Anglo Maikop Corporation, the Maikop Trust and the London Maikop & Australian Maikop, 
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Another reason that could explain71 the difference between authorized cap-
ital and actual investment would be the great number of speculative and fraud-
ulent practices that proliferated during the Maikop oil rush. Since Russian leg-
islation would only allow a British citizen to lease a plot if  he did it in the name 
of a Russian subject,72 the land was leased to a Russian, who would then sub-
let to a Britton. In many cases, the presence of a middleman would lead from 
simple overrun to malpractice. These only got worse when the acquisition of 
funds back in London took place in two phases: in the first stage, a firm would 
be registered and a modest sum authorized for the leasing of the plots; in the 
second, after a fruitless initial prospection, the company’s directors would ask 
for a capital increase with the purpose – real or not – of acquiring new means 
of prospection. For that reason, as one shareholder put it, “... the sharehold-
ers are invited to take part in the too familiar pastime of pulling their stake in 
the hope of making a winning coup that will recover their losses”.73
Finally, in view of the tone of some of the consulted geological reports, we 
harbour a strong suspicion that these weren’t as reliable as they pretended to 
be, since in some cases they seem to have been oriented rather to galvanize in-
vestors than to provide serious scientific information to the oil company.74 
As it often happens with speculative bubbles, the combination of  a lack 
of  technical knowledge and greed contributed to the loss of  millions and to 
the successive creation and destruction of  companies. In that scenario, the 
 
apart from some minor ones; Vinda’s report lists six: Black Sea Oilfields Ltd.; the Maikop Pre-
mier Oil Syndicate, Ltd.; the Anglo-Maikop Corporation, Ltd.; the Maikop Spies Co. Ltd.; 
the Maikop Valley Oil Co. Ltd. and International Maikop, Ltd.. A latter report in Winda 
(1913), identifies 18 companies, in four groups. 
71. “Care should be taken that on concluding agreements for the purchase of  claims in 
Maikop the original certificates issued by the Ekaterinodar District Department are produced. 
Certified copies are valueless. Many cases have occurred here where people have sold their 
claims twice; and a number of  Maikop claims are now offered in the London market not be-
longing to the Cossacks […]”. “City Intelligence”. Times [London, England] 5 April 1910. The 
Times Digital Archive. Web. 11 June 2014. And, “[…] Middlemen are not deterred by the fact 
that they have no more claims to declare and few to sell. They offer to unsuspecting purchas-
ers claims which have already been sold […]”. “City Intelligence”. Times [London, England] 
12 April 1910. The Times Digital Archive. Web. 11 June 2014.
72. In March 1911, the need for a Russian intermediary was suppressed, in exchange for 
the obligation to hire local labour. See De Hautpick (1911).
73. Mr Leach, shareholder of  the Anglo-Maikop Corporation Ltd., in the Separate Ex-
traordinary General Meeting of  1 June 1911 (MS24056), is quoted saying, “I am not a finan-
cial expert, but it seems to me that the shares of  the Company with a capital of  £200,000 can-
not be the same value as those of  a company of  a capital of  £600,000 […] Of course, you can 
rise on this way, but to many of  you, or some of  you, at any rate, it may not be convenient to 
purchase back your property, because, you will understand, the property is just the same”.
74. We find examples of  that in The Times. Also, Fleig Frank (2077:145) cites a case in 
Galicia. The suspicion arose after reading two different versions in Winda, where after an en-
dearing introduction on the importance of the “oil science”, there is a change of opinion about 
the “companies which were earnestly working on the field”.
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only success story was the Anglo-Maikop; a company that described itself  as 
a financial enterprise whose goal was “to assist subsidiary companies in work-
ing various plots over which we have control”.75 “When WWI broke out [the 
AMC] had a capital of  10 million rbls., and accounted for about 94% of the 
total oil production of  Kuban.”76 The company’s success must be attributed 
to the fact that it was the only concern actually investing in Maikop that fos-
tered a modern, vertically integrated oil holding, while creating a market for 
its products. For that reason, the AMC’s evolution symbolizes the transition 
from the oil business based on luck to a new way of  organizing the industry, 
based in the integration and control of  the oil value chain.
The Anglo-Maiko Corporation
In the fourth AMC General Assembly, which took place in December 
1913, George Tweedy said that the company was, basically, “a financial insti-
tution, which has also been able to build up a sound commercial business in 
Russia”.77 And he went on to say that “[…] this enterprise has created an in-
dependent market for crude oil, which might have been rendered very diffi-
cult in the absence of  local means of  refining”.78 In fact, what George Tweedy 
was explaining to his shareholders was that the key to the company’s success 
lay in the fact that in three or four years, by means of  mergers and alliances 
(column 4, Table 1), they had managed to create a vertically integrated, inde-
pendent Anglo-Russian oil company.
At that Assembly, George Tweedy explained that the AMC already con-
trolled the production of  the wells in the Maikop fields as well as the nearby 
ones in Krimsakaya, Taman and several others close to the Azof  Sea (on the 
map, circles 1 & 4 point at downstream activity). The AMC controlled as 
well the midstream, being the main stakeholder of  the pipeline network and 
transportation system for the whole region (lines on the map, and numbers 
2 & 3). Finally, two refineries (circles in the map) and storage facilities for 
the final product (rectangles) had been built. With all the latter, AMC had a 
presence in the downstream segment of  the chain of  value. In fact, taking into 
account the stock he owned and the positions he held in different companies, 
 
75. Mr S.H. Rogers, London Manager of the AMC in the Financial Times, 18 May 1911. 
LMA, MS24056.
76. Akramovsky (2008).
77. Reprinted in The Financial News, 9 December 1913. LMA, MS24056.
78. It could be true, if  we consider that the Maikop Refineries Co, in 1912, with an ini-
tial capital of  25,000 pounds (from 50,000 in February 1911) was paying a dividend of  50% 
and of  70% in 1913 (LMA, MS2410).
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in 1912 George Tweedy is listed as general director in ten Maikop enterpris-
es, as well as for two more companies in Rumania.79 
The integration process took place in a relatively short period of time. The 
AMC was funded at the end of  1909, with a capital of  200,000 pounds and a 
mission to become a financial society “dedicated to prove oil properties and 
to raise the capital for their exploration”.80 At that early stage, a connection 
already existed – via G. Tweedy – between the AMC and Black Sea Oilfields 
Ltd., who owned the first successful well in Maikop. In 1910 AMC’s activity 
focused on four areas. First, they rescued three societies: Maikop Victory Co. 
Ltd, Maikop Midlands Co, and Maikop Valley Oil Company Ltd. (formerly 
British Maikop Co. Ltd. (Table 1, column 4), which held the rights to prom-
ising plots. Then, they promoted a deal involving 20 companies – probably all 
those already working on the field (Table 1, column 3) – in order to create a 
cooperative, with a capital of  20,000 pounds, or the common project known 
as Deep Drilling,81 whose purpose was to manage the extraction of  all the oil 
that could not be reached by hand.82 This joint action achieved two results. 
On the one hand, an attempt was made to modernize Maikop, by applying 
techniques already tested in Galicia by McGarvey – who had imported them 
from Canada – and whom George Tweedy recruited as chief  engineer. On the 
other hand, the project brought together, under the control of  a single com-
pany – Deep Drilling83 – all the concerns operating in Maikop. Thirdly, that 
same year Tweedy negotiated options for the exploration and drilling of  270 
acres at the Levanovskoye property (on map 1, to the northeast of  the first 
Maikop oilfields).
79. In Skinner’s list (1912) the same companies – whose archives we have consulted in 
the LMA – appear under the generic name Anglo-Maikop Group.
80. George Tweedy’s speech at the Fourth Ordinary General Meeting of  the AMC, ad-
journed from 23 December 1914 to 10 March 1915, reprinted in The Financial News, 11 March 
1915. LMA, MS24056.
81. In some documents this venture is called “The Association” or “The Co-operative”, 
which could indicate that maybe in its initial stages the Maikop Associated Oil Properties Ltd. 
or the Maikop Co-operative Petroleum (Table 1) were the Maikop Deep Drilling Co. This op-
eration is explained in the Maikop Oilfields Deeper Drilling Project memorandum, where we 
can find extracts of  a letter from MacGarvey to George Tweedy. LMA, MS24056.
82. “La verité est que beaucoup d’argent a été dépensé en pure perte. L’huile se trouve à 
une profondeur beaucoup plus grande que celle qu’on avait pensé tout d’abord et dernièrement 
en vue d’améilorer leur exploitation […] compagnies pétrolières viennent de se fusionner.”, in 
L’industrie du pétrole in 1911 (p.43), published in Les Assemblées générales. Recueil..., BnF 
with identification ark:/12148/cb327033681/date.
83. In the first general meeting of  the AMC, 17 May 1911, an announcement was made 
in the following terms: “[…] A central organisation has been formed on the field under the su-
preme control of  your general manager, with geological and other technical assistance, and in 
which our allied companies are interested. By this arrangement large savings are affected in the 
general management of  the property […]”. Transcribed in the Financial Times, 18 May 1911. 
LMA, MS24056.
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Thus, only one year after its creation, the AMC had already put down the 
foundations for the centralization of  the downstream activity and had initiat-
ed a territorial expansion. This secured, AMC made its fourth move: an agree-
ment was reached with the Australian Maikop Oil Company Ltd. to create 
the Maikop Pipeline and Transport General Co. From the beginning, the 
partnership established that their future pipelines would transport the oil be-
longing to the Maikop Victory Co. Ltd, Black Sea Oilfields Ltd. and the Lon-
don and Maikop Oil Corporation Ltd.. 
1911 saw the consolidation of the first two segments of the oil chain and the 
construction was undertaken of a solid network of refining and commerciali-
zation facilities. That same year the AMC was refinanced and the new An-
glo-Maikop Corporation Ltd. was registered, together with an increase in cap-
ital (from 200,000 to 650,000 pounds). This was a turning point in George 
Tweedy’s strategy, because it coincided with the beginning of the creation of a 
regional fuel market, which allowed for the completion of the integration of the 
AMC’s holding. In one of his speeches, Tweedy explains that the good perfor-
mance of the company is due to the fact that “we have been able to sell a con-
siderable quantity of oil direct from the wells to our neighbours for fuel and also 
to local manufacturers, who have lately adopted liquid fuel instead of wood”.84 
It is evident that this commercialization had been possible because a min-
imal infrastructure already existed for refining and storage (see map 1). None-
theless, Tweedy was right in explaining to his shareholders that he was creat-
ing a brand new regional fuel market by introducing a new product in the area.
From that point of  view, Tweedy was following in the footsteps of  the 
Baku industry. It is true that part of  the AMC’s success was due to the scar-
city and higher cost of  alternative fuel in the region,85 but the company’s com-
mitment to Tweedy’s strategy, especially in the highly speculative scenario of 
1911 Maikop, is not at all without merit. In that sense, although the transi-
tion had already taken place in Russia and despite the fact that the Royal 
Navy was beginning to adapt its fleet to the use of  liquid fuel, G. Tweedy 
stands out as one of  the shrewdest entrepreneurs of  his time.86 Tweedy’s be-
lief  that oil was the fuel of  the future was unquenchable: “[…] I was led to do 
so for the simple reason that of  the different products that can be obtained 
from crude oil, there are [only two] for which there will be an increasing and 
practically unlimited demand, namely benzene (petrol), which can be taken 
84. Transcribed by the Financial News in FT, 1 March 2011. Consulted in LMA, 
MS240056.
85. Ibid 31 to 33
86. Although much has been said about the effect of  the Royal Navy’s conversion to oil 
during WWI, statistics on the use of  energy in the UK for 1911 reveal that 95.3% of the con-
sumed fuel was still coal, whereas oil represented a mere 0.8% of the total. Source: Energy His-
tory, database in http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~histecon/energyhistory/energydata.html, Warde 
(2007) in Kander et al. (2013).
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off  the total residue, which may be regarded as liquid fuel […] When I say a 
practically unlimited demand, I refer to the rapid progress in the substitution 
of  coal for oil”. His prediction proved to be right.87 
After 1911, the AMC’s strategy focused on strengthening its integration 
and in the expansion of  its market. In 1912, additional capital was attracted 
to finance the first of  a series of  fusions between the surviving Maikop com-
panies. In that way, AMC began to manage Maikop Premier Oil Syndicate 
Ltd. and Maikop Oil and Petroleum Producers Co.88 At about the same time, 
pipelines and other transportation and refining infrastructures were brought 
together under one society, also controlled by the AMC.89 
In July 1912, a new refinery was commissioned, with a capacity of  7 mil-
lion poods (114,66 tons) per annum. This meant that the Maikop Refineries 
Company Ltd., under the AMC’s umbrella, had the capacity to process al-
most all the crude oil produced in Maikop.90 The refinery was built as a rem-
edy to insufficient demand in the region, since “the demand at remunerative 
prices is much in excess of  the present capacity”.91 In 1913, after having pro-
cessed 4 million poods of  crude oil (65,52 tons), the “(…) products [found] a 
ready market at good prices in Southern and Central Russia”.92 A few years 
later, AMC would close a deal with the Grozni producers to refine their oil.93 
Almost at the same time, an agreement was reached to build a pipeline 
that would connect the Grozni oilfields with the Maikop system,94 and later 
87. “The profit under Russian revenue account of £18,535 is derived chiefly from the mar-
keting of practically all the oil produced on the Maikop field, and from our charges of storage 
at Ekaterinodar. Arrangements have been made with all the companies […]. This method of han-
dling the oil has proved very satisfactory to all parties. The corporation has established a distri-
bution department, which has a complete knowledge of the requirements of purchasers of crude 
oil and refined products in South Russia […].” Chairman’s speech at the Second Ordinary Gen-
eral Meeting of the AMC. Reprinted in the Financial News, 4 January 1913.  LMA, MS24056.
88. Another wave of  fusions took place in 1915, with the creation of  Black Sea Amal-
gamated Oilfields Ltd. The Maikop Combine was the result of  the fusion between Maikop As-
pheron Oil Company Ltd. (which had a previous understanding with Maikop Shirvansky), 
Maikop Areas Ltd. (already in agreement with Maikop Oil and Petroleum Co. Ltd.), Maikop 
Hadijensky (previously in league with Maikop Central Co Ltd.) and the Maikop General and 
Petroleum Trust.
89. The first step was taken in September 1912, when a fusion was agreed upon by Mai-
kop Pipeline and Transport Co. and the Mutual Oil Transport Co. (MS 24098). Three more 
companies joined afterwards under the name Maikop Pipeline and Transport General Co..
90. George Tweedy must have made his projections based on the production of  the Mai-
kop fields on the year previous to the erection of  the 1911 refinery, which was of  7.8 million 
poods. Ibid 49.
91. Maikop Refineries. Second Ordinary General Meeting, 16 July 1912. LMA, MS24106.
92. Maikop Refineries. Director’s Report. Third Ordinary General Meeting, June 1913. 
LMA, MS24106.
93. Kuban Refining Company. Minutes Book. 1 July 1914. LMA, MS24070.
94. Letter from AMC to the Maikop Pipeline and Transport Co., 24 February 1913. 
LMA, MS2409. In December 1914, the company received an offer for an option in a conces-
sion granted by the Russian government, for the construction of  the pipeline between Grozny 
and the Black Sea.
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another deal was signed with the Kuban River Steamships Company.95 After 
that, any company in the region intending to sell or refine crude oil had to 
deal with AMC. In fact, the minutes of  the AMC’s Committee of  Directors 
show that between 1913 and 1915, any few remaining independent companies 
had no option but to become part of  the AMC’s network.96
The end of 1913 and first months of 1914 were devoted to the culmination 
of the creation of the first independent oil market. Internally a central purchas-
ing body of sorts was created, whose function was to sell machinery and equip-
ment and to provide technical assistance and support – through contracts with 
AMC – to allied and associated companies. A distribution department was also 
created, whose task was the development of a retail sector for oil-derived prod-
ucts in all of Southern Russia. Externally, an exportation network97 was de-
signed for the marketing of oil-related products in Germany (1912), and to es-
tablish “a small company for the distribution of petrol to England (1914)”.98 
The First World War, however, put an end to this project.99
At that moment, when Tweedy’s strategy was beginning to bear fruit,100 
another turning point took place: the Russification101 of  the Anglo-Maikop 
Corporation.
In his speech to the fifth Ordinary General Assembly, Tweedy explains 
that a Russian company is being created, subject to Russian law, to which all 
the assets of  the AMC holding in Russia are meant to be transferred. He jus-
tifies the move by saying that it had not been planned from the beginning, 
since the AMC was a finance company, “but almost from its inception so few 
operations of  this character presented themselves that for practical reasons it 
has not done that for which it was formed. At the same time, while preserv-
95. In the Fourth Ordinary General Meeting of  the AMC, the Chairman said, “[…] our 
interests in steamships and river transport business are also higher […] We have been steadily 
adding to our investment in this direction, and we now hold half  of  the capital of  the Kuban 
Steamship Co..” Reprinted by the Financial News, 11 March 1915. LMA, MS24056.
96. LMA, MS24055/001 and MS24005/002; “Maikop Spies Experience”. Times [Lon-
don, England] 26 March 1914: 21. The Times Digital Archive. Web. 11 June 2014.
97. Maikop Refineries. Director’s Report. Third Ordinary General Meeting, June 1913. 
LMA, MS24106.
98. Kuban Refining Company. Minutes Book. 13 July 1914. LMA, MS24070.
99. “[…] We made a commencement last summer with the importation of Maikop oil prod-
ucts to England. We felt that there was an outlet […], but, unfortunately, the war has prevented 
us from benefiting by the knowledge gained from our initial importation”. George Tweedy’s 
speech at the Fifth Ordinary General Meeting of AMC, December 1915. LMA, MS24056.
100. See notes 11 & 12.
101. “It is a common idea that the trade in Russia and with Russia after the War will be 
phenomenal and there is no doubt that Russia will require our assistance in the development of 
her resources. If  we wish to take part in the new conditions we must prepare plans ahead. This 
has been done by us and our Russian Company […].” George Tweedy’s speech at the AMC meet-
ing, 31 May 1917. LMA, MS24056. The Russian Company is the Russ-English Maikop Petrole-
um and Trading Co. It was created in 1915, under Russian law, and took on AMC’s Russian as-
sets. (Minutes of the Boards of Directors AMC, 11 December 1915. LMA, MS24055/001.
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ing our large holding in the allied companies, we have succeeded in building 
up an agency business which has become valuable […] and you will readily 
understand that a Russian company with English directors within the corpo-
ration should bring considerable ‘grist to the mill’, not necessarily connected 
with oil”.102 This last statement might sound out of  character, since Tweedy 
had always maintained that oil was “the great industry of  the future”;103 once 
more, however, he was right.
The outbreak of  the Great War and the succession of  events thereafter 
make it impossible for us to know what would have become of these projects 
if  history had taken another turn. At this point, we can speculate whether 
George Tweedy had planned this move in order to diversify his activity only 
as a survival strategy, or whether he did so because he had already realized 
that in the post-war international oil industry, the little independent compa-
nies would have no place. For whatever reason, during those years Tweedy fo-
cused his activity on Russia and transformed the AMC into a diversified hold-
ing, and a purveyor of  fuel and totuol to the Russian army. Even well into the 
first years of  the Soviet revolution, Russia was still seen as a “natural” and 
promising market for the AMC,104 as we see in the report of  the eighth Gen-
eral Assembly of Shareholders of 1919. Two years after, on 20 February 1920, 
the Kuban Refining Company still reports that “satisfactory profits [were] 
made by the company in Russia”.105 
Conclusions
This article puts into context the forgotten history of  a British free stand-
ing company, the Anglo-Maikop Corporation, which took part in the Mai-
kop “oil rush”. Its narrative differs from most of  the literature on the Maikop 
102. In the minutes of  the AMC’s directors committee, January 917 (MS24055/002), 
there is a mention to this diversification of  the business. The Kuban Refining Company was 
transformed into a soap and oil factory, whose products were marketed through the commer-
cial network of the new “Russian company”. Furthermore, approval was granted for a propos-
al by George Tweedy for the creation of  an import/export Russian company for the sale of  to-
bacco. In the minutes of  the Kuban Refining (LMA, MS24070) there are also references to the 
Caucasus wood business (August 14th 1919), and mentions to the exportation of  tobacco and 
cotton as well as to banking and insurance (September 14th 1919).
103. In the adjourned Fourth General Meeting of  the AMC, March, 10h 1915, we can 
read ‘Everything points to the oil business being the great industry of  the future. This has been 
particularly emphasised in connection with the European War. In fact, it has been called an 
“oil war”. Battleships transport, air observations, submarine expeditions, all are dependent on 
oil and its products […] Oil is getting the biggest free advertisement ever known, and I am 
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British free standing companies in several aspects. Most authors qualify the 
Maikop phenomenon as a failure (Jones, 1981; White, 1989), they talk of  a 
certain amount of  knowhow transference from the United Kingdom to Rus-
sia (Davenport-Hines & Jones, 1989), and suggest that part of  the Maikop fi-
asco was due to a lack of  knowledge about the Russian way of  doing business 
(White, 1989).
As seen in this article, the case of  the AMC doesn’t fit these parameters. 
In arguing that, we take into account the fact that at the end of the nineteenth 
century, the Russian oil industry – especially the companies belonging to the 
Nobels and the Rothchilds – had faced the same problems as Standard Oil in 
the United States, and all of  them had created vertically integrated industries, 
albeit with significant differences to their solutions, since in Russia a new na-
tional market had been created for the “new” fuel. This concurs with the af-
firmations by Tolf  (1976) and Jones (1978) in the sense that at the time, the 
Russian oil industry had been the most “modern” in the world.
We have then explained the clues to the AMC’s success story amidst the 
Maikop “failure”. We have established that George Tweedy, unlike other in-
vestors and entrepreneurs working there, had learnt his trade in the “modern” 
Russian oil industry. From there, and following Fleigh Frank’s idea (2007) 
that the oil industry of  the twentieth century was built on the shoulders of 
individual entrepreneurs who benefited from their belonging to a determined 
social, political and cultural context in which local, regional, continental and 
global influences interacted, we can establish that the AMC’s success is part-
ly due to George Tweedy’s previous experience in Baku. The Anglo-Maikop 
Corporation contributed – on a small scale but using the same methods the 
Nobels had used – to the transition to petroleum in Southern Russia: AMC 
created a new market for a new product – petroleum as liquid fuel – and it 
controlled the midstream and the downstream of the chain of  value, and es-
tablished itself  as the buyer-driven lead-firm in Maikop. 
On the other hand, unlike the rest of  the British investors in Russian oil 
at the time, George Tweedy: a) did not bring to Maikop his knowhow from 
the UK, but rather from his experience and contacts in Baku, and b) he did 
have a great knowledge of  the Russian language, customs and culture.
For all these reasons, we consider that bringing out the AMC’s story, as 
small as it may be considered within the context of  the international oil in-
dustry, helps to qualify some of  the facts long established by the mainstream 
narrative on the fiasco of the free standing British companies who invested 
in Maikop in 1910.
Finally, and at the risk of  stepping into the domain of  speculation, the 
present article suggests some questions as to what could have been the influ-
ence of  the Russian oil industry in the development of  what has come to be 
known as the international oil industry.
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■
The Success of  the Anglo-Maikop Corporation Within the Fiasco of  the 
Maikop “Oil Rush”
ABSTRACT
The present article reviews the history of  the Anglo-Maikop Corporation (AMC); a 
free-standing company which, in 1910, took part in the speculative oil rush originating in the 
City of  London and whose target was the Maikop oilfields in Russia. Although the Maikop 
phenomenon was a fiasco, the AMC prospered. The company all but disappeared during the 
first years of  the Bolshevik revolution, but between 1910 and 1914 it was able to make the tran-
sition from coal to oil in Southern Russia, and created a successful, vertically integrated oil 
holding. In this article, we argue that this success, which is in stark contrast to the failure of  the 
company’s peers, was mainly due to the fact that the AMC’s founder, George Tweedy, was very 
knowledgeable of  the Russian oil scene of  the time, which was, at the beginning of  the twenti-
eth century, the most advanced oil industry in the world.
KEYWORDS: Russia, oil, foreign direct investment
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■
El éxito de Anglo-Maikop Corporation en el contexto del fiasco de la «fie-
bre del petróleo» de Maikop
RESUMEN
El presente artículo repasa la historia de Anglo-Maikop Corporation (AMC), que fue una 
free-standing company que, en 1910, participó en una «fiebre del petróleo» originada en la City 
de Londres. El objeto de este fenómeno especulativo fue la explotación de los yacimientos pe-
trolíferos de Maikop en Rusia. A pesar de que esta aventura colectiva fue un fiasco, la AMC 
se convirtió en un holding petrolero integrado de éxito. La compañía, sin embargo, aunque le-
galmente no se disolvió hasta después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, desapareció durante los 
primeros años de la revolución bolchevique. En este artículo se expone que el citado éxito, que 
contrasta con el fracaso de otras iniciativas similares, se debió a que el fundador de AMC, 
George Tweedy, era un buen conocedor de la industria petrolera rusa de inicios del siglo XX. 
Esta era entonces la industria petrolera más avanzada del mundo, habiéndose ya realizado en 
Rusia la transición del carbón al petróleo.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Rusia, petróleo, inversión directa extranjera
CÓDIGOS JEL: N53, N55, L12, L25, L71
